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ABSTRACT

This Article contends that an informed discussion on an AI Bill
of Rights requires grappling with biometric data collection and its
integration into emerging AI systems. Biometric AI systems serve
a wide range of governmental purposes, including policing, border
security and immigration enforcement, and biometric cyberintelligence and biometric-enabled warfare . These systems are increasingly categorized as "high-risk" when deployed in ways that may
impact fundamental constitutional rights and human rights. There
is growing recognition that high-risk biometric AI systems, such as
facial recognition identification, can pose unprecedented challenges
to criminal procedure rights. This Article concludes that a failure
to recognize these challenges will lead to an underappreciation of
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the constitutional threats posed by emerging biometric AI systems
and the need for an AI Bill of Rights.
INTRODUCTION

On October 8, 2021, the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy ("OSTP") invited the public to discuss Public and Private Sector Uses of Biometric Technologies through a Notice of Request for Information ("RFI"), published in the Federal Register. 1
Shortly thereafter, OSTP Director Eric Lander and OSTP Deputy
Director for Science and Society Alondra Nelson, issued several media and White House releases, including an opinion piece titled,
Americans Need a Bill of Rights for an Al-Powered World, 2 and a
Press Release titled, Join the Effort to Create a Bill of Rights for an
Automated Society. 3 This Article addresses both: concerns attached
to biometric technologies and the need for an AI Bill of Rights. 4
Rather than treat these topics as separate and distinct, this Article attempts to integrate the two. It argues that biometric AI systems must be seen as a constitutive force behind conceptualizing an
AI Bill of Rights. To ground potential AI-driven harms concretely,
this Article focuses on facial recognition technology, a biometric
technology that utilizes AI. The increasing reliance on facial recognition technology by the government poses unique challenges to
1. Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Public and Private Sector Uses of Biometric Technologies, 86 Fed. Reg. 56,300 (Oct. 8, 2021).
2. Eric Lander & Alondra Nelson, Americans Need a Bill of Rights for an Al-Powered
World, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-bill-of-rights-artificial-intelligence/ (citing, e.g., Drew Harwell, The Accent Gap, WASH. POST (July 19, 2018)
h ttps: //www.washingtonpost.com/grap hics/2018/business/alexa-does-not-understand-youraccen t/;_Ka shmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match ,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html; Paul Mozur, One Month, 500,000 Face Scans: How China Is Using
A.I. to Profile a Minority , N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04
/14/technology/china-surveillance-artificial-intelligence-racial-profiling.html; Tom_Simonite,
How an Algorithm Blocked Kidney Transplants to Black Patients, WIRED (Oct. 26, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/how-algorithm-blocked-kidney-transplants-black-patients/).
3. Press Release, White House, Join the Effort to Create a Bill of Rights for an Automated Society (Nov. 10, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/11
/10/j oin -the-effort-to-create-a -bill-of-rights-for-an -automated-society/.
4. Multiple scholars have offered careful analysis of data-driven and algorithmic harms
of big data and AI technologies. See generally, e.g., CATHY O'NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH
DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016);
VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: How HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND
PUNISH THE POOR (2018); SAFIYA NOBLE , ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: How SEARCH
ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM (2018); FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK Box SOCIETY: THE
SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst , Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104 CAL. L. REV. 671 (2016); Anupam Chander, The Racist Algorithm?, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1023 (2017) (book review); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH.
L. REV. 1 (2014); Jessica M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 EMORY L.J. 59(2017).
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criminal procedure protections under the Bill of Rights. These challenges include potential stressors placed on the Fourth Amendment's protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, the
Fifth Amendment's protection of the right against self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment's protection to confront witnesses
under the Confrontation Clause. 5 Under the Sixth Amendment, for
example, a criminal defendant is owed the opportunity to confront
witnesses and prosecutorial evidence. However, as this Article explores, confronting AI technologies, such as facial recognition technology that may be presented in a criminal case to establish the
defendant's identity or to support evidentiary claims of criminal
wrongdoing, may be difficult. 6
Part I provides an overview of biometric data, including how it is
currently defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
("DHS"). It focuses on capture of biometric data by DHS for purposes of border security and homeland security. As a case study,
this Article contends that biometric collection by the DHS is indicative of both the government's exponentially increasing appetite for
biometric data and the expansion of biometric AI systems. Part II
explains why biometric data is increasingly integrated into AI technologies, especially for law enforcement, and intelligence and national security purposes. Part III discusses why an informed effort
to create an AI Bill of Rights requires grappling with biometric data
and its integration into emerging AI systems, especially for predictive policing and biometric cybersurveillance purposes.
Biometric AI systems are increasingly categorized as "high-risk
AI systems" by other governing bodies, such as the European Commission7 ("EU Commission") and human rights organizations
within the European Union ("EU"). 8 The EU has recognized that
5. U.S. CONST. amends. IV-VI. See infra Part 11.B. See also, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Facial Recognition and the Fourth Amendment, 105 MINN. L . REV. 1105, 1126 (2021) ;
E lda r Haber, Racial Recognition, 43 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 101 n.165 (2021) (citing State v.
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016)); Adam Liptak, Sent to Prison by a Software Program's
Secret Algorithms, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/01/us/politics/sent-to-prison-by-a-software-programs-secret-algorithms.html); Andrea Roth, Machine
Testimony, 126 YALE L. J. 1972, 1983 (2017); Joseph Clarke Celentino, Note, Face-to-Face

with Facial Recognition Evidence: Admissibility Under the Post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (2016).
6. See infra Part 11.B (citing, inter alia, Roth, supra note 5).
7. European Commission , Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence
Act) and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, COM (2021) 206 final (Apr. 21 , 2021)
[hereinafter EU 2021 Artificial Intelligence Act Proposal].
8. European Digital Rights et al. , A Civil Society Statement: An EU Artificial Intelligence Act for Fundamental Rights, ALGORITHM WATCH (Nov. 30, 2021), https://algorithmwatch.org/en/eu-artificial-intelligence-act-for-fundamental-rights/.
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certain biometric AI systems should be understood as high-risk
when impacting fundamental constitutional rights and human
rights. In a recent proposal for greater AI regulation, the EU Commission recognized that biometric AI systems require additional
oversight and recognition of their potential impact on fundamental
rights. 9 This Article concludes that a conversation on an AI Bill of
Rights should be paired with a comparative approach to biometric
data and biometric AI system regulation that is occurring in the
EU. By monitoring the EU's approach to high-risk AI systems generally, and high-risk biometric AI systems specifically, the dialogue
on an AI Bill of Rights and AI regulation will be more informed in
the United States.
I.

A.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT USE OF BIOMETRIC DATA

Biometric Data: Public Collection and Use

Biometric identification involves the measurement of physiological characteristics. Biometric data used in biometric identification
technologies can include a range ofbiometric identifiers. 10 In addition to digital photos and video feeds utilized for facial feature analysis through facial recognition technology, other biometric data
may include digitally scanned fingerprints and iris scans, keystroke
analysis, voice and gait analysis, and other identifiers. 11 DNA is
included as a biometric identifier in some contexts and excluded in
others. 12 The DHS deemphasizes the genome as a biometric to enable the use of de-identified health data for research purposes,
while the DHS includes DNA within a proposed definition of
9. See infra Part II.A (citing EU 2021 Artificial Intelligence Act Proposal, supra note 7).
10. See, e.g. , Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, 88 IND. L .J. 1475, 1477 n .3
(2013) (citing, e.g. , BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (Joseph N.
Pato & Lynette I. Millett eds., 2010); A. MICHAEL FROOMKIN & JONATHAN WEINBERG, CHIEF
J USTICE EARL WARREN INST. ON LAW & Soc. POL'Y, HARD TO BELIEVE: THE HIGH COST OF A
BIOMETRIC IDENTITY CARD (2012) , http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Believe_Report_Final.pdf; KELLY A. GATES, OUR BIOMETRIC FUTURE: FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY AND
THE CULTURE OF SURVEILLANCE (2011); ANIL K. JAIN ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO BIOMETRICS
(2011); JENNIFER LYNCH, FROM FINGERPRINTS TO DNA: BIOMETRIC DATA COLLECTION IN U.S.
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITIES AND BEYOND (2012); SHOSHANA AMIELLE MAGNET, WHEN
B IOMETRICS FAIL: GENDER, RACE, AND THE TECHNOLOGY OF IDENTITY (2011); Laura K.
Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional Abyss: Remote Biometric
Identification Comes of Age, 97 M INN. L. REV. 407 (2012)).
11. See, e.g. , Margaret Hu, Biometric Surveillance and Big Data Governance, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE LAW 121, 126 (David Gray & Stephen E. Henderson eds., 2017).
12. Jennifer K. Wagner et al. , Comment Letter on Notice of Request for Information
(RFI) on Public and Private Sector Uses of Biometric Technologies 7 (Jan. 5 , 2022) (copy on
file with author).
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biometrics in order to enable a broad definition for border security
and other security rationales. 13 From a governmental standpoint,
DNA collection for databasing and database screening by various
federal agencies is not clearly defined as biometric per se. 14
The United States federal government is at the earliest stages of
regulating how the government should collect and use biometric
data. Congress has not clearly defined biometric data or when it is
appropriately collected. 15 Federal agencies have commenced the
process of attempting to define biometric data under a regulatory
regime.16 As of yet, there is not a unified federal approach to imposing limitations on biometric data collection and use. 17 Experts
have noted that there is a need to expressly recognize tensions in
how best to define and apply biometric data. Unresolved questions
include who is responsible for oversight of biometric standards and
the deployment of emerging biometric technologies; how biometric
data can be used, by whom, and under what circumstances; and,
when biometric systems may be appropriately used for identification purposes or other policy objectives.
Similarly, AI is also at the earliest stages of regulation in the
United States. What is not clearly understood by many policymakers in the United States is how certain AI systems are increasingly
reliant on biometric data, including the failure to recognize the precise relationships between biometric technology and the AI systems
utilized by that technology. 18 Consequently, this Article focuses on
how biometric-based AI systems challenge the current data governance frameworks in unprecedented ways 19 that underscore the
13. Id.
14. See Wagner et al., supra note 12.
15. See id. at 7.
16. See id.; see generally Dan Berger et al., Biometric Data and Midnight Regulations,
REGULATORY REV. (Mar. 11, 2021), https://www. theregreview.org/2021/03/11/berger-hukatsanis-wagner-biometric-data-midnight-regulations/.
17. See Wagner et al., supra note 12, at 7; see generally Berger et al., supra note 16. See
also infra Part III.B.
18. See, e.g., Jan Czarnocki, Will New Definitions of Emotion Recognition and Biometric
Data Hamper the Objectives of the Proposed AI Act?, in 2021 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
OF THE BIOMETRICS SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP (BIOSIG) (Arslan Bromme et al., eds. , Inst. of
Elec'l. & Elec's. Eng'rs 2021); Mia Hoffmann & Mario Mariniello, Biometric Technologies at
Work: A Proposed Use-Based Taxonomy , POL'Y CONTRIBUTION no. 23, Nov. 2021 (defining
"biometric technologies as AI t echnologies that rely on biometric data to derive inferences
about the individual whose data is collected").
19. This Article is a continuation of the author's past research on the legal challenges
attached to biometric cybersurveillance.
See Margaret Hu, Algorithmic ,Jim Crow,
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 633 (2017); Margaret Hu, Biometric ID Cybersurveillance, supra note
10; Margaret Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 955 (2017); Margaret
Hu, Horizontal Cybersurveillance Through Sentiment Analysis, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J .
361 (2017); Wagner et al. , supra note 12.
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urgent need for an AI Bill of Rights. The underdevelopment of AI
regulation is especially pronounced when examining the risks to
criminal defendants and the criminal procedure protections that
may be compromised under the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.20

B.

DHS Expansion of Biometric Collection

To better understand biometric-based AI systems, this Article
uses as a case study a DHS-issued Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
("NPRM"), titled Collection and Use of Biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS). 21 At the end of the Trump
administration, on September 11, 2020, a proposed rulemaking illustrated the rapid expansion of proposed biometric data collection,
purportedly for the purposes of homeland security and immigration
enforcement. Specifically, the NPRM stated that: "Biometrics
means the measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) or
behavioral characteristics of an individual, including an individual's fingerprints, palm prints, photograph (facial image), signature, iris (iris image), voice (voice print), and/or DNA (partial DNA
profile) (subject to the limitations in 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2))." 22 DHS
further stated that its biometrics can include "voluntary DNA testing to verify a claimed genetic relationship." 23 The proposed regulation did not rely upon congressional authority. The expansion of
both how biometric data was defined as well as how biometric data
could be used was dramatic. The NPRM expanded the definition
and collection of biometric data to authorize vetting and tracking
individuals throughout the "immigration lifecycle." Although the
status of the NPRM and biometric collection policy under the Bi den
administration is unclear, a recent DHS Privacy Impact Assessment ("PIA'')24 appears to adopt DNA verification screening by DHS
without clear statutory authority. 25
20. See infra Part II.B.
21. Collection and Use of Biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, 85
Fed. Reg. 56,338 (proposed Sept. 11, 2020).
22. Id. at 56,414 (emphasis removed).
23. Id. at 56,350.
24. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., DRS REFERENCE No. DHS/CBP/PIA-071, PRIVACY IMPACT
ASSESSMENT FOR THE OPERATIONAL USE OFFAMILIAL DNA (2021), https://www.dhs.gov/sites
/defaul t/files/publica tions/priva cy-pia -cbp 071-opera tion al useoffamilialdna -sep tember2021.pdf.
25. Id. at 1 (citing Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft, 415 F. Supp. 3d 980, 990 (S D.
Cal. 2020) (requiring U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to conduct DNA t esting to
verify parentage before separating migrant adult from child)); see also Tally Kritzman-Amir,
Swab Before You Enter: DNA Co llection and Immigration Control, 56 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
77, 78 (2021)
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This NPRM illustrates how biometric data forms the cornerstone
datapoint for a wide range of AI-driven immigration-related vetting
and database screening protocols. 26 DHS often commences screening protocols with biometric data as a form of identity verification.
Beyond identity verification, biometric AI tools and systems can assist DHS and other governmental entities with profiling individuals
to form the basis of risk assessments and predictive analytics. 27
The data architecture necessary for biometric AI systems has expanded dramatically in the past two decades since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. There have been proposals for biometric electronic identity cards such as a biometric ePassport, 28 for
example, which, if implemented, would dramatically expand biometric data collection through mass collection and universal databasing. Further, the Trump administration's Executive Order
13780, commonly referred to as the Muslim Ban or Travel Ban,
mandated the "Expedited Completion of the Biometric Entry-Exit
Tracking System" by DHS. 29 The extreme vetting protocols proposed by the Trump administration also expanded social media surveillance as a part of screening procedures. 30 Through biometric AI
systems promulgated under predictive policing and national security objectives, biometric cybersurveillance tools fuse biometric and
biographic data with social media profiling to assess risk. 31

II.

A.

BIOMETRICS AND AI

High-Risk Al Biometric Systems

In April 2021, the EU Commission proposed for public comment
a comprehensive AI regulation. 32 It explained that the goals of the
proposed law were multifold: to safeguard fundamental rights, to
ensure a harmonization of EU rules relating to AI, and to promote
excellence and trustworthiness in AI and AI regulation. 33 Referred
to as the AI Act, the proposal is officially titled: "Laying Down Harmonized Rules on Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act)
26. Hu , Algorithmic ,Jim Crow, supra note 19, at 639-40 (internal citations omitted).
27. See, e.g. , id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 640 n.45 (citing Exec. Or der No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg 13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017)).
30. See id. a t 640-41.
31. See, e.g. , Margaret Hu, The Ironic Privacy Act, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 1267, 1288-90
(2019).
32. EU 2021 Art ificial Intelligence Act P roposal, supra not e 7.
33. Id. See also, e.g. , Mauritz Kop, E U Artificial Intelligence Act: The European Approach
to AI, TRANSATL. ANTITRUST & IP R DEVS. (Oct. 1, 2021), h ttps: //law.stanford.edu/publications/eu -artificial-intelligence-act-the-european -approach-to-ail.
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and Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts." 34 The AI Act proposes to adopt a risk-based approach to AI regulation. Article 13,
for instance, emphasizes the need for AI transparency: "High-risk
AI systems shall be designed and developed in such a way to ensure
that their operation is sufficiently transparent to enable users to
interpret the system's output and use it appropriately." 35
Importantly for the purposes of this Article, the AI Act recognizes
the link between AI technologies and biometric identification, and
the risk to fundamental rights. The AI Act identifies certain "highrisk AI" technologies that integrate biometric data in contexts that
might impose harm in public safety and surveillance. 36 These
"high-risk AI systems" are contained in Annex III of the AI Act. 37
Other AI systems are characterized as posing "unacceptable risk." 38
Except for certain law enforcement and national security justifications, the AI Act classifies AI systems that are deployed for realtime biometric identification as falling within the unacceptable risk
category. 39
The AI Act proposes that specific fundamental rights warrant
protection from AI harms, such as anti-discrimination values and
expressive freedoms. The AI Act identifies that social scoring systems, in particular, "may lead to discriminatory outcomes and the
exclusion of certain groups." 40 Specifically, such scoring systems
"may violate the right to dignity and non-discrimination and the
values of equality andjustice." 41 Regarding biometric identification
systems, the proposed EU law identifies the intrusive nature of biometric surveillance as infringing upon fundamental freedoms, impacting privacy rights that could lead to "a feeling of constant surveillance and indirectly dissuade the exercise of the freedom of assembly and other fundamental rights." 42 The proposed AI Act further identifies that criminal procedure protections might be vulnerable to remote biometric identification technologies. The harms associated with biometric AI systems could encompass, for example,
databasing, inadequate safeguards, lack of proportionality, probabilistic and predictive conse quences, and negative inferences. 43
34. Id.
35. EU 2021 Artificial Intelligence Act Proposal, supra note 7, at art.13.
36. Khari Johnson, The Fight to Define When Al is 'High Risk', WIRED (Sept. 1, 2021 ,
8:00 AM), https: //www.wired. com/story/fight-to-define-when-ai-is-high-risk/.
37. EU 2021 Artificial Intelligence Act Proposal, supra note 7, at art. 6(2).
38. Id. at art. 5, mem. § 5.2.2.
39. Id. at art. 5.
40. Id. at recital (17).
41. Id.
42. Id. at r ecital (18).
43. Id. at recitals (19)- (20).
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Standalone AI systems identified in Chapter 1 of Title III of the
AI Act "with mainly fundamental rights implications that are explicitly listed in Annex III" are AI systems "whose risks have already materialised or are likely to materialise in the near future." 44
For the Annex III high-risk AI systems, the AI Act proposes newly
developed AI compliance and oversight mechanisms, including impact assessment procedures. 45 The proposal recognizes the special
risks posed by "remote biometric identification systems." 46 The AI
Act suggests that internal controls can be implemented by AI providers; however, remote biometric identification systems "would be
subject to third-party conformity assessment[,]" and would also be
subject to "comprehensive ex-ante conformity assessment through
internal checks, combined with a strong ex-post enforcement[.]" 47
Title IV of the law focuses on the manipulative risks of AI systems
that involve human interactions and "are used to detect emotions
or determine association with (social) categories based on biometric
data" or "generate or manipulate content'' (such as with deep
fakes). 48

B.

Biometric Al Systems and Criminal Procedure Risks

In the United States, biometric AI systems place unique stress
points on criminal procedure protections, demonstrating why they
are fairly characterized as "high-risk." 49 AI is increasingly integrated into criminal investigation and used as evidence. 50 There
are several points in a criminal investigation and proceeding where
biometric AI and cybersurveillance are vulnerable to failing to
Id. at m em. § 5.2.3.
Id. at tit. III, ch s. 2, 3.
Id. at recital (18).
Id. at m em . § 5. 2.3.
Id. at mem. § 5.2.4.
See generally, e.g., ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING
Jennifer Daskal, Pre-Crime Restraints: The Explosion of Targeted, Non-Custodial
Prevention, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 327 (2014); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Algorithmic Risk Governance: Big Data Analytics, Race and Information Activism in Criminal ,Justice Debates, 23
THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 453 (2019); Margaret Hu, Algorithmic ,Jim Crow, supra note 19;
Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal ,Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043 (2019); Rashida Richardson et al., Dirty Data, B ad Predictions: How Civil Rights Violations Impact
Police Data, Predictive Policing Systems, and ,Justice, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 192 (2019); Sahil
Chinoy, Opinion, The Racist History Behind Facial Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2019),
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
(2017);

https://www .nytimes.com/2019/07 /10/opinion/facial-recognition-race.h tml; Woodrow Hartzog
& Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition Is the Perfect Tool for Oppression, MEDIUM (Aug. 2 ,
2018) , https://me dium .com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppression-bc2a 0
8f0fe66/.
50. Christopher Rigano, Using Artificial Intelligence to Address Criminal ,Justice Needs ,
NAT'L INST. JUST. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/using-artificial-intelligence-address-crimina 1-j ustice-needs.
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conform to the protections historically afforded under the Fourth,
Fifth, and Sixth Amendments.
Under the Fourth Amendment, biometric AI concerns encompass
the collection, use, and storage of biometric data. The presentation
of biometric data-for example, the public view of one's face, either
physically or digitally--can be captured in a digital image and then
processed by facial recognition technology. If the government undertakes the collection of facial images, it could be argued that this
falls outside the scope of a search and seizure. This is especially
true if the biometric data collection was collected administratively
and not in the service of a specific law enforcement investigation.
Therefore, broad surveillance captures may fall outside of the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment. 51
In AI systems, biometric data collection and use often does not
stop with a simple data point, such as a digital image of a face for a
single facial recognition technology use. The aggregation of biometric identification data with other sources of data supports new
AI innovations in criminal enforcement52 and national security contexts, such as biometric cyberintelligence and biometric-enabled
warfare. 53 The type of AI-enabled evidence that can be derived from
biometric AI include correlative evidence and predictive findings,
for example, facial recognition technology that purports to serve as
a form of identity verification as well as predictive of criminal or
terrorist intent. Additionally, database screening can also deploy
algorithms that are a part of a biometric AI architecture. 54 Cyber
searches and data seizures can result in Fourth Amendment harms
through the surveillance and AI analytics. Analysis of biometrics
data fed into other AI-driven risk assessment can lead to AI-driven
surveillance tools that erode or infringe upon reasonable
5 1. See, e.g ., Margaret Hu, Orwell's 1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveilla.nce
Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1824 (2018).
52. See, e.g ., CLARE GARVIE ET AL., GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH. , THE PERPETUAL
LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 1 (2016), https ://www.perpetuallineup.org; Ferguson, Facial Recogni.tion, supra. note 5; Mariko Hirose , Privacy in Public Spaces: The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Against the Dragnet Use of Facial Recognition Technology , 49 CONN. L. REV. 1591, 1594 (2017); Brenda Leong, Facial Recognition
and the Future of Privacy: I Always Feel Like .. . Somebody's Watching Me, 75 BULLETIN
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 109, 109 (2019); Katelyn Ringrose, Comment, Law Enforcement's Pa.iring of Facial Recognition Technology with Body-Worn Cameras Escalates Privacy Concerns,
105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 57, 59-61 (2019).
53. See generally, e.g., ANNIE JACOBSEN, FIRST PLATOON: A STORY OF MODERN WAR IN
THE AGE OF IDENTITY DOMINANCE (2021); Margaret Hu, Biometric Cyberintelligence and the
Posse Comita.tus Act, 66 EMORY L.J. 697 (2017).
54. See, e.g. , Elazar Zadok, Legislative and Ethical Questions Regarding DNA and Other
Forensic "Biometric" Data.bases, in ETHICS AND POLICY OF BIOMETRICS 37 (Ajay Kumar &
David Zhang eds. , 2010); see also citations supra. notes 5, 10- 12, 16- 19, 53, 54.
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expectation of privacy protections, such as those asserting privacy
to facial recognition technologies and geolocation privacy under the
Fourth Amendment. 55
Under the Fifth Amendment, many experts have focused on AI
and the risk of procedural due process deprivations. 56 However, increasingly biometric AI also raises self-incrimination concerns. Returning to the example of facial recognition technology, in one case,
a magistrate judge denied an application for a search warrant that
would have compelled unlocking digital devices through biometric
identification such as facial recognition and digitally stored fingerprints. 57 The court denied the application on the grounds that compelling the production of biometric data would violate the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 58 The reasoning
of the order denying the application analogized the forced compulsion of participation in biometric AI, such as the type of biometric
AI used in the security features of digital devices, to forced production of passwords. 59
Andrea Roth contends that machine testimony poses particular
concerns under the Sixth Amendment and, in particular, challenges
the protections of the Confrontation Clause. 60 The Confrontation
Clause allows for a criminal defendant to confront witnesses and
evidence used against them. 61 "[I]n criminal cases, machine sources
of accusation-particularly proprietary software created for litigation-might be 'witnesses against' a defendant under the Confrontation Clause." 62 AI-driven determinations introduced as evidence

55. See generally, e.g., Micha el L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016).
56. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249,
1253 (2008); Margot E. Kaminski & J ennifer M. Urban, The Right to Contest AI, 121 COLUM.
L. REV. 1957, 1989 (2021).
57. Matter of Residence in Oakland, California, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1010, 1014 (N.D. Cal.
2019).
58. Id. at 1016.
59. Id. at 1015. Several publications have discussed th e potential impact of the case Matter of Residence in Oakland, California, and the issu es of forcing compulsion of biometrics to
bypass biometric authentication. See, e.g., Ariel N. Redfern, Comment, Face It-The Convenience ofA B iometric Password May Mean Forfeiting Your Fifth Amendment Rights, 125 PENN
ST. L. REV. 597, 626 (2021); Adam Herrera, Comment, Biometric Passwords and the Fifth

Amendment: How Technology Has Outgrown the Right to Be Free from Self-Incrimination,
66 UCLA L. REV. 778 (2019); see also Orin S. Kerr, Compelled Decryption and the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 97 TEX. L. REV. 767, 778-82 (2019); contra Bryan H. Choi, The
Privilege Against Cellphone Incrimination, 97 TEX. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 73-75 (2019).
60. Roth, supra note 5.
61.
62.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Roth, supra note 5, at 1983 (citing contra Brian Sites, Rise of the Machines: MachineGenerated Data and the Confrontation Clause, 16 COLUM. Ser. & TECH. L. REV. 36, 99-100
(2014)).
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in criminal law processes raise so-called "black box" concerns. 63 For
example, the inscrutability of predictive analytics and correlative
determinations through big data assessments has led to concerns of
whether AI harms in a criminal proceeding can be adequately protected by the Sixth Amendment with an appropriate "confrontation" when the AI itself has little explanatory power. 64
AI tools that use biometrics to identify individuals are known to
be fallible, and are not guaranteed methods of identification. 65 Inaccurate facial recognition matches have led to wrongful arrests
and jail time, while poor handling of DNA evidence have led to the
same. 66 For instance, Amazon's facial recognition tool "Rekognition," when used on members of the U.S. Congress, falsely matched
twenty-eight sitting legislators with mugshots. 67 The same issues
of innate fallibility combine with issues of overconfidence in AI tools
and inadequate understanding of the results by juries, judges, and
even prosecutors. 68
Further, facial recognition tools have been shown to lead to racially biased results, with people of color being disproportionately
matched incorrectly more frequently than others. 69 This is just one
example of algorithmic bias present in AI tools trained from a

63. Roth, supra note 5, at 1978.
64. Id. at 2048-50.
65. See Bess Stiffelman, No Longer the Gold Standard: Probabilistic Genotyping Is
Changing the Nature of DNA Evidence in Criminal Trials, 24 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 110, 131
(2019); Drew Harwell, Amazon Facial-Identification Software Used by Police Falls Short on
Tests for Accuracy and Bias, New Research Finds, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2019), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/01/25/amazon-facial-identifica tion -softwareused-by-police-falls-short-tests-accuracy-bias-new-research-finds/.
66. Kashmir Hill, Another Arrest, and Jail Time, Due to a Bad Facial Recognition Match,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/29/technology/facial-recognition-misidentify-jail.html; Katie Worth, Framed for Murder By His Own DNA, THE
MARSHALL PRO,JECT (Apr. 19, 2018, 7:00 AM) , https://www.th emarshallproj ect.org/2018/04
/19/framed-for-murder-by-his-own-dna.
67. Jacob Snow, Amazon's Face Recognition Falsely Matched 28 Members of Congress
with Mugshots, ACLU (2018), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-technology/surveillancetechnologies/amazons-face-recognition-falsely-matched-28.
68. See, e.g., Victor Nicholas A Metallo, The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Forensic
Accounting and Testimony- Congress Should Amend "The Daubert Rule" to Include a New
Standard, 69 EMORY L.J. ONLINE 2039 (2020). Important research has considered how technology such as innovations in forensic evidence can influence criminal justice procedures and
impact outcomes. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (2009); Tamara F. Lawson, Before
the Verdict and Beyond the Verdict: The CSI Infection Within Modern Criminal ,Jury Trials ,
41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 119 (2009); Andrea Roth, Safety in Numbers? When DNA Alone is Enough
to Convict, 85 NYU L. REV. 1130 (2010); Laurie Meyers, The Problem with DNA, APA
MONITOR, June 2007, at 52.
69. Snow, supra note 67.
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homogenous sample set. 70 More extensive audits found that there
were facial recognition tools that "reduced accuracy disparities" relating to race and gender, but such disparities were still present. 71
Another way that racial disparities in biometric analysis by AI
tools leads to actual disparities in justice outcomes is through the
application of predictive policing systems. 72 Predictive policing
aims to distribute police resources more efficiently to areas at times
where crime is more likely to happen based on patterns discerned
by AI through historical records. But, like other fallible AI tools,
datasets used to generate predictive policing AI suffer from historical biases that leads to greater policing in neighborhoods with
greater minority populations. 73 Predictive policing systems now
target specific individuals that have been ascertained to be "at risk"
of causing violent crimes. 74 The greater the power of these predictive policing systems become, the greater the drive will be to collect
more data to further their application and power, including the collection of biometric data to integrate facial recognition and DNA in
surveillance and prediction systems without proper transparency
and security. 75
It is also critical to observe the inherent limitations and challenges of AI tools when deployed as criminal evidence. AI evidence,
once introduced, involves an explanation obstacle: the inability of
the prosecution or its witnesses to explain how results are acquired
by AI tools. This creates difficulties in interrogating the results of
the tools to decide innocence or guilt. Source code of biometric analysis tools like DNA forensic software has been withheld by forensic
software companies under IP protections of trade secret status. 76
Other times, the biometric analysis tools are based on an underlying AI that is a black box, typical of neural network machine-learning, whose decision making cannot be interrogated. 77 As a result,
70. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You're a White Guy, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/09/technology/facial-recognition-race
-artificial-intelligence.html.
71. See, e.g. , Inioluwa Deborah Raji & Joy Buolamwini, Actionable Auditing: Investigating the Impact of Publicly Naming Biased Performance Results of Commercial AI Products
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2019 AAAI/ACM CONFERENCE ON Al, ETHICS, AND SOCIETY 429
(2019).
72. See generally Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1109 (2017).
73. See, e.g., Richardson et al. , supra note 49.
74. See, e.g., Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, supra note 72, at 1137-42.
75. Id. at 1167- 68, 1186- 87.
76. See, e.g., Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the
Criminal ,Justice System , 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1358-62 (2018)
77. See, e.g., Katherine Kwong, The Algorithm Says You Did It: The Use of Black Box
Algorithms to Analyze Complex DNA Evidence, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275 (2017); Roth,

296

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 60

issues in discovery can arise where the AI "witness" cannot be readily "deposed'' to explain the veracity of the results and outcomes. 78
Ill. AI BILL OF RIGHTS

A.

Bill of Rights and Anticipating Biometric Al Harms

The United States Bill of Rights was modeled on the English Bill
of Rights of 1689, 79 the Declaration of Independence, so and various
state constitutions to safeguard fundamental liberties, 81 limit government power, and to sustain a democratic form of governance. 82
Some of the rights enshrined in the Bill of the Rights were intended
to be the rights of the people, or "collective and popular" rights. 83
Other rights were intended to be restraints on governmental power,
for example, the first two amendments of the Bill of Rights safeguarded "the rights of popular majorities ... against a possible unrepresentative and self-interested Congress." 84 The Bill of Rights
served" as [a] beacon-light[] to guide and control the action of [state]
legislatures, as well as that of Congress." 85
Under any project undertaken to envision an AI Bill of Rights, it
is appropriate to consider the protection of fundamental rights from
biometric cybersurveillance harms. Recent empirical findings assessing United States public perspectives on biometric data collection and use across various contexts indicates that the United
States citizenry is increasingly aware of potential privacy harms
that can attach to biometric systems. 86 Just as the Bill of Rights
was intended to constrain Congress and the states from unlawful
Safety in Numbers?, supra note 68; Jim Shook et al. , Transparency and Fairness in Machine
Learning Applications, 4 TEX. A&M J . PROP. L. 443, 448-449 (2018); Matthew Shaer, The
False Promise ofDNA Testing, ATLANTIC (June 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine
/archive/2016/06/a -reasona ble-doubt/4807 4 7/.
78. See Roth, supra note 5, at 2044- 48.
79. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION,
25 n.25 at 24, 31-32, 60 (1998).
80. See, e.g., id. at 106-09.
81. See, e.g., id. at 30 ('In the Continental Congress's 1774 Declaration of Rights and in
all six of the Revolutionary-era state constitutions affirming a right of the people to assemble,
the right was explicitly yoked to the right of petition.") (citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., id. at xii; see also CHRISTOPHER L EISGRUBER, CONSTITUTIONAL SELFGOVERNMENT 2-3 (2001).
83. AMAR, supra note 79, at 30.
84. Id. at 21.
85. Id. at 154 (quoting Nunn v. Georgia, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)).
86. Sara H. Katsanis et al., U.S. Adult Perspectives on Facial Images, DNA, and Other
Biometrics, 3 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON TECH. & SOC'Y 9 (2022), https://doi.org/10.1109
/TTS.2021.3120317; Sara H. Katsa nis et al. , A Survey of U.S. Public Perspectives on Facial

Recognition Technology and Facial Imaging Data Practices in Health and Research Contexts,
PLoS ONE (2021), https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone. 0257923.
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infringements and encroachments, an AI Bill of Rights must function similarly to preserve individual rights and government restraint.
Biometric AI that is often deployed in criminal and terrorist
screening is structured to serve both identification and risk assessment purposes. 87 Predictive analytics operationalize biometric-enabled AI systems that are structured to preempt crime and terrorism before they occur. Because these AI systems aim to identify
data-driven suspects or suspicious data from an ocean of data, law
enforcement and the intelligence community perceive biometric
data as an anchor point, critically important for identity verification. Consequently, biometric cybersurveillance in the context of
predictive policing and national security is critical to the project of
envisioning how biometric AI stresses criminal procedure rights
and other constitutional protections. 88

B.

Looking Ahead

As discussed above, the AI Act proposed by the EU explicitly links
AI technologies, biometric identification, and the risk to fundamental rights. 89 Some question whether the AI Act will accomplish the
regulatory goals set forth by the draft to provide a sufficiently robust framework to prevent AI harms to fundamental rights. 90
Whether the AI Act may or may not be crafted in a way that can
achieve its goals, the proposed law's recognition of the extent of
potential harms that biometric AI systems may inflict is instructive
in envisioning the need for an AI Bill of Rights.
Similarly, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation
("GDPR") could also be useful in informing how best to shape new
Bill of Rights protections. 91 First, the GDPR considers the need to
87. Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism, supra note 19, at 991-93.
88. See, e.g ., Hu, Algorithmic ,Jim Crow, supra note 19; Hu, Crimmigration-Counterterrorism , supra note 19; Michael Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms,
and the Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PENN. L. REV. 871(2016); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big
Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2015); Sohayla M. Roudsari, Fourth Amendment ,Jurisprudence in the Age of Big Data: A Fresh Look at the "Penumbras" Through the Lens of ,Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence in United States v. ,Jones, 9 FED.
CTS. L. REV. 139, 140 (2016).
89. Khari Johnson, The Fight to Define When Al is 'High Risk', WIRED (Sept. 1, 2021, 8:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-to-define-when-ai-is-high-risk/; see discussion supra
Part II.A
90. See, e.g., Natasha Lomas, Europe's Al Act Falls Far Short on Protecting Fundamental
Rights, Civil Society Groups Warn, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 30, 2021, 10:55 AM),
https://tech crunch.com/2021/11/30/eu-ai-act -civil-society-recommendations/.
91. Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April
2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data
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frame data rights as a form of individual rights. For instance,
GDPR's Articles 13-15 focus on a data subject's right to access
data, 92 and Articles 21 and 22 address a data subject's right to object
to and opt out of automated decision-making. 93 Next, facial recognition technology falls within the GDPR's regulation of both personal data and biometric data. Personal data is defined as: "any
information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person
('data subject')" and encompasses both direct and indirect forms of
identification." 94 Biometric data is defined as: "personal data resulting from specific technical processing relating to the physical
... characteristics of a natural person, which allow or confirm the
unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images
. . . . " 95 Finally, the processing of personal data under the GDPR
requires that it be undertaken in a "lawful, fairly, and ... transparent manner[.]" 96 The GDPR, as a precursor to the proposed AI Act,
demonstrates one model of how to restrain biometric AI system
harms by embedding data rights within an AI Bill of Rights.
The EU's model of AI regulation, emphasizing transparency and
greater accountability, is instructive in framing how best to protect
criminal procedure protections afforded under the Sixth Amendment. The Sixth Amendment mandates that a defendant be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" and the Confrontation Clause guarantees a right to know one's accusers. 97 Under
an AI Bill of Rights, those accused could be guaranteed the right to
know the source of the data collected and used, the nature of the
algorithm, and the interpreter of the AI-enabled outcome-to be
"informed of the nature and cause of the accusation." 98 Guaranteeing the right to confront the AI forms the foundation of the tools of
defense of the accused in cases where the prosecution relies upon
AI evidence.
In short, the project of imagining an AI Bill of Rights benefits
from a comparative approach to biometric data and biometric AI
system regulation in the EU. The GDPR greatly expands the potential for better regulating biometric AI systems, already categorized as "high-risk" systems and "unacceptable risk" systems by the
and on the Free Movement of Such Data , 2016 O.J. (1119), https://eur -lex.europa.eu/
eli/reg/2016/679/oj.
92. Id. at arts. 13-15.
93. Id. at arts. 21 , 22.
94. Id. at art. 4(1).
95. Id. at art. 4(14).
96. Id. at art. 5(1)(a).
97. U. S. CONST. amend. VI.
98. Id.
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EU's proposed AI Act. 99 In recognizing the strain biometric AI systems are placing on criminal procedure protections under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments-as well as better understanding that biometric AI systems require additional oversight
due to an expanding impact on fundamental rights-it is critical to
look to the EU for greater guidance in how to construct AI Bill of
Rights protections.
Already in the United States, reform efforts are underway that
recognize the need for greater regulation of AI and high-risk biometric systems such as facial recognition systems used in law enforcement contexts. 100 During the 116 th Congress, several bills were
introduced to address federal uses of facial recognition technology.
For example, a Senate bill proposed to create a moratorium on facial
recognition technology pending a Commission study to assess its
impact, 101 and also to impose warrant requirements upon federal
law enforcement for searches utilizing facial recognition technology.102 However, to date, federal legislation does not provide additional oversight for facial recognition technology uses by law enforcement.103 States and local jurisdictions are increasingly considering bans on facial recognition technology. Portland, Maine, for
example, banned city government officials from "using or authorizing the use of any facial surveillance software on any groups or
members of the public ...." 104 States such as Illinois, Texas, and
Washington have passed laws restricting biometric use and protecting biometric privacy. 105 Other states are proposing efforts to
99. EU 2021 Artificial Intelligence Act Proposal, supra note 7.
100. See, e.g. , JAMES A LEWIS & WILLIAM CRUMPLER, CTR. STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDS. ,
FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: RESPONSIBLE USE PRINCIPLES AND THE LEGISLATIVE
LANDSCAPE 5-6 (2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/facial-recognition-technology-responsi ble-use-principles-and-legislative-landscape.
101. Ethical Use of Facial Recognition Act, S. 3284, 116th Cong. (2020) (introduced by
Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-Ore.) and Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ)) (not passed).
102. LEWIS & CRUMPLER, supra note 100 (citing Facial, Analysis, Comparison, and Evaluation Protection Act, H .R. 4021 , 116th Cong. (2019) (introduced by Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY16), Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC), Rep. Nydia Velazquez (D-NY-7), Rep. Debra A
Haaland (D-NM-1) , and Rep. Jose Serrano (D-NY-16) (not passed))).
103. Jd. appat17.
104. Brian Heater, Portland, Maine Passes Referendum Banning Facial Surveillance,
TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 4, 2020, 12:05 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/11/04/portland-mainepasses-referendum-banning-facial-surveillance/.
105. See Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/1-99; TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (regulating "Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier"); WASH. REV.
CODE §§ 19.375.010-.900 (regulating "Enrollment, Disclosure, and Retention of Biometric
Identifiers"); see also, e.g., LEWIS & CRUMPLER, supra note 100; The Evolution of Biometric
Data Privacy Laws, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 4, 2021), https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/brief/biometric-data-privacy-laws-and-lawsuits/. Other state laws such as th e California Consumer
Privacy Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798. 100-.199. 95, and the California Privacy Rights Act, AB.
1490, 2021- 2022 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2021), are not solely biometric privacy laws, however,
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specifically study facial recognition and AI technologies, and its impact. The Virginia General Assembly, for instance, proposed House
Joint Resolution No. 59, calling for the formation of a Joint Commission on Technology and Science to study and report on "the proliferation and implementation of facial recognition and artificial
technology within the Commonwealth." 106 The resolution reasoned
that "facial recognition implicates constitutional concerns related to
unreasonable searches and seizures [under the Fourth Amendment] as well as individual privacy[.)" 107 To date, the resolution has
not passed.108 The lack of a unified legislative approach at the federal level, combined with the increasing disunity of state and local
approaches, to the regulation of biometric data and biometric AI
systems, underscores the need for an AI Bill of Rights, a framework
of rights that is capable of complementing and buttressing statutory developments or administrative oversight through other laws
and regulations.
CONCLUSION

Biometric AI systems are increasingly being developed for a wide
range of governmental purposes, including policing, border security
and immigration enforcement, and biometric cyberintelligence and
biometric-enabled warfare. Collection of biometric data in the criminal procedure context can exacerbate preexisting harms, such as
historic over-policing of minority communities. AI analysis of biometric data has been known to be flawed in several cases, potentially aiding law enforcement, investigators, and prosecutors in
their work, but also introducing sources of bias, and commonly understood AI fallibilities.
Better understanding the impact of biometric AI systems will be
critical to the project of developing an AI Bill of Rights. 109 As signaled by the EU Commission's proposed AI Act, public and private
uses of biometric identification systems carry increasing risks: the
more comprehensive and ambitious biometric AI technologies are
also encompass biometric data protections. The Evo lution of B iometric Data Privacy Laws,
supra note 105.
106. H.J.R. 59, 2020 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2020) (introduced by Del. Lashrecse D.
Aird (D-Petersburg)).
107. Id.
108. Legislation Related to Artificial Intelligence, NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Jan.
5, 2022), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/20
20-legislation-related-to-artificial-intelligence. aspx.
109. See Eric Lander & Alondra Nelson, Americans Need a Bill of Rights for an AIPowered World, WIRED (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.wired.com/story/opinion-bill-of-rights-artificial-intelligence/.
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in scope, the greater the risks are to the protection of fundamental
rights. Both the proposed AI Act and the GDPR combined offer important ways to construct the types of rights and values necessary
for an effective AI Bill of Rights, including the need to conceptualize
data rights as fundamental rights and how biometric AI systems
can infringe upon criminal procedure rights.
By closely examining the sweeping biometric collection proposed
in the September 2020 NPRM in the final weeks of the Trump administration, 110 this Article suggests that the rapid expansion of biometric collection by DHS is also a case study for the expansive ambition of AI by the government generally. Without explicit acknowledgment of biometric AI system risks, the potential harms of attempts to broaden biometric data definitions and increase the collection of biometric data, and the potential ability to embed biometric data into emerging AI systems for multiple domestic and national security programs may be misunderstood. DHS is not only
one of the primary drivers of expansion of biometric data collection,
but also a driver of AI-enabled biometric cybersurveillance: biometric AI systems that rely upon biometric identifiers to anchor
predictive policing and risk assessment profiling under purported
border security and national security justifications. Beyond identity verification purposes, biometric AI systems are deployed to aggregate and analyze individuals and groups to conduct social scoring and project risk, to serve evidentiary and prosecutorial purposes, and to inform actionable intelligence.
AI-enabled biometric cybersurveillance carries the risk of substituting new technologies in place of traditional criminal evidence
that criminal procedure protections under the Bill of Rights might
not be able to sufficiently address. This Article concludes that a
failure to recognize these challenges will lead to an underappreciation of the constitutional threats posed by emerging biometric AI
systems. The growing recognition that high-risk biometric AI systems can pose unprecedented challenges to criminal procedure
rights is core to the project of conceptualizing the need for an AI Bill
of Rights.

110. Collection and U se of Biom et rics by U. S. Citizenship a nd Immigration Services , 85
F ed. Reg. 56338 (proposed Sept. 11, 2020).

